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Abstract  
This study addresses two questions: first regarding China’s ability to respond to its rapidly 
ageing population, and second what China can learn from Denmark in their approach to this 
challenge. Denmark, along with the other Scandinavian countries, is generally considered well 
adapted to demographic change. This paper aims to examine if the experiences of Denmark can 
add insights that are useful for the development of a sustainable and financially responsible 
approach to population ageing in China. Reviewing the respective demographic challenges of 
both China and Denmark, together with the provisions of old-age security and care, this paper 
presents an examination of their adaptability to demographic change. Finally, the paper outlines 
three factors from which China arguably could learn from the Danish approach to demographic 
change. It is evident from studying the Danish approach to demographic changes that pensions 
are not the sole focus; stimulating labour force participation, creating initiatives to postpone 
retirement and work longer and enforcing pro-natal polices are all part of the solution. Due to 
this, this paper argues that the main lesson to be learned from Denmark is that there is a need 
for a holistic approach to demographic change; reforming the pension system is only one part.  
Keywords: China, Denmark, universalism, demographic change, pensions, old-age 
dependency 
 
Introduction 
Since the mid-2000s, a substantial body of literature has emerged on the subject of China’s 
ageing population, most of which measures and proposes solutions to China’s demographic 
challenge. There is increasing concern that the burden of ageing will prove an overwhelming 
impediment to continued economic growth and challenge the fiscal conditions of the fragile 
public pension system (Cai, 2016; Dong & Wang, 2016; Frazier & Li, 2017; Peng, 2013; van 
Dullemen & Bruijn, 2017).  
This paper presents an examination of China’s response to the demographic challenge. 
With a focus on demographic indicators and old-age pensions, attempts to accommodate 
demographic changes (given rapid modernisation) are investigated. The comparative focus will 
be on Denmark. Denmark has addressed demographic challenges and changes effectively 
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whilst having maintained a nearly universal public pension system. Denmark and the 
Scandinavian welfare states in general, are recognised as being “well adapted to demographic 
change” (Andersen & Hatland, 2014: 258) and have been proactive in addressing their 
respective demographic situations by reforming their pension and retirement systems (Kangas 
et al., 2010; Mercer, 2018). According to the Danish Economic Council, the Danish pension 
system and the welfare state in general is sustainable throughout the Century, vis-á-vis the 
ageing of the population (Danish Ministry of Finance, 2018). 
The study seeks to address the question of how China can respond to its increasingly 
ageing population. The main focus will be on investigating barriers and solutions, based on 
experiences gained from the Danish approach to demographic change, in creating a sustainable 
old-age pension system given the current demographic transition.  
An important question in political science is; how can experiences from social security 
reforms be transferred from one country to another? The Danish welfare system, part of the 
Scandinavian welfare model, is well known in China, and research on Scandinavian social 
welfare has increased as “Chinese researchers and policy-makers want to learn from the 
successful experiences [of the Swedish social welfare model]” (Johansson & Cheng, 2016: 
922). Furthermore, the term ‘appropriate universalism’, which has become key in recent social 
policy reforms in China (Kongshøj, 2015), signifies some reliance on Sino-Nordic policy 
learning. As a case in point, there are several references to various policies in Denmark, 
Sweden, and Norway in the report Constructing a Social Welfare System for All in China from 
the Development Research Centre of the Chinese State Council (CDRF, 2012), which is an 
official think-tank reporting directly to the Chinese prime minister. Furthermore, the CDRF 
took part in a study tour to Copenhagen in 2008, with the intent of studying socialised old-age 
security in Denmark. 
This article goes beyond policy learning and diffusion. One critical question to ask is; 
whether China could and should learn from a country such as Denmark? First, it can be argued 
that a wide range of conventional measures and existing scientific instruments are contextually 
dependent and there should be no doubt that the Danish context differs from the Chinese by 
magnitudes. Secondly, when the demographic transition commenced in Denmark, the 
conditions for welfare state development were different compared with what they would be if 
this process had started today. Third, increased longevity due to improvements in wealth, 
lifestyles, education, healthcare, etc., has changed dependence patterns, and made the issue of 
old-age security and care increasingly urgent. Last, individual needs for old-age security and 
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care interact with the specific context in an ageing society, i.e. demographic behaviour is shaped 
by the context.  
Due to these considerations, this paper does not suggest that Danish policies/schemes 
could be emulated in China, but rather examines whether the experiences of Denmark can add 
insights to the development of a sustainable and financially responsible approach to 
demographic change in China, even given the huge contextual difference.  
This paper is structured as follows: first, the demographic challenge and support burden 
facing China is assessed, with a focus on the present until 2050; second, a comparison of the 
Chinese and Danish pension systems is provided. More importantly, their respective 
adaptability to demographic change are evaluated. Last, three recommendations are provided, 
from which it is argued that China could gain insights from Denmark in their attempt to address 
the demographic challenge. 
 
Assessing the demographic challenge in China 
In response to rapid population growth, the Chinese government introduced the voluntary ‘later-
longer-fewer’ policy at the beginning of the 1970s. The policy was designed to encourage later 
childbearing, longer spacing between childbirths, and fewer children. This policy contributed 
to a dramatic reduction in the total fertility rate (TFR) - the total number of children born per 
woman of child-bearing age - from an estimated 5.9 in 1970 to 2.9 in 1979. Despite this 
reduction, fears of overpopulation continued, and the one-child policy was enacted in 1979. 
Following the introduction of the one-child policy, the TFR continued to fall, but at a steadier 
pace (Hesketh et al., 2005; Zeng & Hesketh, 2017).  
The Chinese government introduced the one-child policy as a means of lifting China out 
of extreme poverty, through population containment (Zeng & Hesketh, 2017) . With some 
minor exceptions, the policy was strictly enforced in urban areas. In most rural areas, the one-
child policy was deemed unfavourable and practically unenforceable, as children were regarded 
as both part of the workforce, due to the labour capital of children, and the main provider of 
care in old age (Cameron et al., 2013; Liu, 2014; Zeng & Hesketh, 2017). Since then, the policy 
has undergone several amendments (for a thorough overview see Zeng & Hesketh, 2017: 389-
394), leading to the abolition of the one-child policy in 2015 and the subsequent introduction 
of the universal two-child policy. 
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Figure 1. Changes in China’s population age structure, 1960–2015 and 2020–2050 UN 
projections 
 
Source: UN, 2017 
 
In this case, the elderly population is set at 60+ years, rather than the customary 65+ years, 
as 60 years old is the traditional marker of being old in China, as well as the current pension 
age.  
 
Figure 2. Changes in Denmark’s population age structure, 1960–2015 and 2020–2050 UN 
projections 
 
Source: UN, 2017  
 
China has experienced significant demographic change since the 1960s (see Fig. 1). A 
combination of increasing life expectancy and lower fertility rates has provided China with a 
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large demographic dividend from a relatively young and productive population group. 
According to some calculations, 10 to 20 percent of China’s growth over the past three decades 
can be attributed to this demographic dividend, which has now reached a point of exhaustion 
(Cai & Cheng, 2014; Cai, 2016). 
China’s population is currently ageing at an unprecedented rate, and future projections 
(see Fig. 1) indicate that this trend will continue. The projections suggest that China has entered 
an accelerated period of ageing. For a comparison with Denmark, see Fig. 2. A sustained low 
fertility rate means that the size of the working age population (defined here as 15-59 years old) 
will decline rapidly as the elderly population rises significantly. At its peak in 2010, the working 
age population reached 70% of the population. By 2050, the proportion is estimated to decline 
to about 50% of the population (as shown in Fig. 1). 
Many have blamed the Chinese family planning policies for the current demographic 
situation, and some have suggested that these policies have prevented upwards of 400 million 
births (Wang & Fong, 2009; Zeng & Hesketh, 2017). However, this is contested by others, 
claiming that modernisation (and over-burdening young families with care obligations) can 
account for a major part of the fertility decline. Similar trends have been observed in other 
developing countries in Eastern Asia, such as South Korea, where the TFR decreased from 4.3 
to 2.3 between 1970 and 1990, and Thailand, where the TRF decreased from 5.6 to 2.1 during 
the same period (WB, 2017). Since 1990 fertility rates in South Korea have plummeted far 
below the Chinese figures during the one-child regime. This also holds for Japan and for 
European countries that have failed to relieve families sufficiently from their obligations of care 
for children and the elderly. Danish fertility figures have remained closer to the reproduction 
level.  
 
Table 1. Life expectancy and total fertility rate for Denmark, China, and other comparable 
countries, 1960 & 2016 
 Life expectancy at birth, total (men 
and women) (years) 
Total fertility rate (TFR) 
 
 1960 2016 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016 
Denmark 72.2 80.7 2.6 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.7 
Germany1 69.3 80.6 2.4 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 
China 43.7 76.3 5.7 5.6 2.6 2.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 
Thailand 54.7 75.3 6.1 5.6 3.4 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.5 
 
1 Germany is included as an example of a typical Continental European country. The figures for Germany are a 
compilation of data from BRD and DDR.     
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Japan 67.7 84 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 
South 
Korea 
53 82 6.1 4.5 2.8 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.2 
Source: WB, 2017  
 
Table 1 presents the development of life expectancy and TFR in Denmark, Germany, 
China, and other East Asian countries, from 1960 to 2016. No country reveals an increase in 
life expectancy comparable to China, though South Korea comes close, and apart from Thailand 
and South Korea, no countries can match China’s decline in fertility. China has a high 
dispersion of life expectancy, for instance, in 2010 life expectancy ranged from 78 years in the 
richest cities, such as Shanghai, to around 64 years in the poorest (e.g. the autonomous region 
of Tibet) (NBS, 2010).  
Regarding fertility, China’s decline from a TFR of 5.7 in 1960 to 1.6 in 2016 is dramatic. 
However, the decline is not unique when compared to Thailand. Moreover, China’s TFR of 1.6 
is well above countries like Japan or South Korea. Actually, it is around the European average, 
though it is slightly lower than in Denmark.  
 
Figure 3. Old-age dependency ratios (ratio of population aged 65+ per 100 population 
aged 15-64) in Denmark and China from 1950-2015, and with 2020-2050 UN projections  
 
Source: UN, 2017  
 
As life expectancy increases and fertility decreases, the old-age dependency ratio rises.  
As compared to Denmark and Europe in general, China’s population has remained extremely 
young until now, with an old-age dependency ratio of only 13.3 in 2015 (Fig. 3). It should be 
noted, though, that some regions have a much higher ratio. According to the China Statistical 
Yearbook 2018 (NBS, 2018), the old-age dependency rate is highest in Chongqing (20.6), 
Birgitte Egeskov Jensen  JCIR: Vol. 7, No. 1 (2019) 
27 
 
followed by Sichuan (19.8), and Jiangsu (19.2). However, a great deal of these differences are 
likely a result of migration, as the old-age dependency ratio is calculated based on the residing 
population. At the other extreme, Tibet has an old-age dependency ratio of 8.2 (NBS, 2018), 
which is most likely due to low life expectancy in the region.  
As shown in Fig. 3, China is predicted to overtake Denmark in terms of old-age 
dependency ratio by 2050. Of course, this depends on future fertility rates and mortality, but it 
is certain that there is rapid and dramatic change ahead. 
 
Support capacity 
Given the worrying demographic trend in China, the current and future capacity to support the 
elderly people will be briefly examined, through the society-support ratio. Support ratios 
provide an overview of the capacity of the working age population to provide support for the 
elderly (the ratio of 20-64 year olds to the number of people aged 65 years and above), whereas 
the old-age dependency ratio (Fig. 3) shows the opposite, that is, the proportion of the elderly 
in need of support. It is important to examine these ratios to gain insight into the sustainability 
of the Chinese pension system.   
 
Table 2. Society-support ratios in China and Denmark 
 Society-support ratio, 
1950 
Society-support ratio, 
2015 
Est. society-support ratio, 
2050 
China 11.8:1 6.9:1 3.1:1 
Denmark 6.4:1 3.0:1 2.2:1  
Society-support ratio: Age 20-64 / Age 65+  
Source: UN, 2017  
 
As revealed by Table 2, the society-support ratio in China in 2015 was 6.9:1, meaning 
that there was almost seven working-age people to support one person aged 65 or above. Even 
though this has changed much since 1950, it remains very favourable as compared to society-
support ratio of 3.0:1 in Denmark.  
However, in universal welfare states (such as Denmark), there is universal access to the 
public pension system. Therefore, it suffices to examine the society-support ratio, because the 
entire population participates in the pension scheme. Conversely, in China a far smaller 
proportion of the population contributes to the public pension system, because coverage is not 
yet universal. Due to this, the measure is not representative of the ‘actual’ support capacity in 
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China. To show this, we need knowledge on the amount of people contributing to the public 
pension system and the amount of people receiving pension benefits; known as the system-
support ratio.  
According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2018 (NBS, 2018) the Chinese system-
support ratio stood at 3.3:1 in 2017. However, it is highly likely that this differs greatly across 
the country.  
Thus, examining the system-support ratio in China enables us to observe the ratio of 
people contributing to the public pension system to those receiving pension benefits. The 
Chinese system-support ratio is much lower than the society-support ratio, because firstly the 
number of people who actually participate in pension schemes is far lower than the number 
eligible for participation, and secondly because of the low pension age in China. There was a 
3.3:1 ratio of benefit contributors to retirees in 2017. These system-support ratios are similar to 
the Danish society-support ratios in 2015. However, considering China has not yet attained its 
demographic target, without further reforms these are likely to change significantly, as the 
workforce reduces, the ageing cohort grows, and the contributors become fewer. This raises 
questions about the sustainability of the Chinese welfare system and the capacity to handle an 
ageing population. 
 
Overview: the Danish response to demographic challenges 
As illustrated in the figures above, China has entered a period of accelerated ageing and is 
projected to overtake Denmark by 2050 in terms of old-age dependency ratios by a small 
margin. Even though projections for 2050 are roughly similar for China and Denmark, the 
demographic challenges differ according to their magnitude.  
Unlike China, Denmark has adopted wide ranging policy reforms to address the 
demographic challenge. This pertains to pension reforms, stimulating labour supply through 
‘activation’ of the entire social and tax system, and through pro-natal policies. Several 
initiatives have been targeted at postponing retirement, creating incentives to work longer, and 
seeking employment (see e.g. Ebbinghaus, 2011; Andersen, 2011; Jensen & Madsen, 2015). 
Employment rates among 55-64-year olds has for decades been high in Denmark since 
the traditional homemaker family model began to lose importance in the 1980s. In addition, in 
recent years the employment rate of those over the age 70 years has increased rapidly. An 
analysis made by the Danish trade union ‘Ledernes Hovedorganisation’ in spring 2019, 
revealed that the age of working people over the age of 70 has risen from around 31.000 in 
2006 to 55.340 in 2016. An increase of 77% (Lederne, 2019).  
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At the same time, provision of public childcare and elderly care has ensured 
comparatively high fertility rates, alleviating the demographic challenge. Still, the Danish 
government considered this insufficient, and the demographic challenge has been addressed 
proactively. First, by pension reforms to ensure adequate and sustainable pensions, and second, 
by extracting as much labour as possible from the working age population, including initiatives 
to prolong the working age. The initiatives can be divided into two categories: ‘pull’ and ‘stay’. 
Pull factors view retirement as voluntary and related initiatives focus on (for example) making 
retirement less attractive by raising retirement age, or by creating economic incentives not to 
retire. In Denmark, a voluntary early retirement scheme enabling people to retire at favourable 
conditions from the age of 60 has been almost phased out through a series of reforms in 1998, 
2006 and 2011. Stay initiatives have included a number of initiatives that emphasise the 
importance of good working conditions and competitive salary, by framing seniors as ‘grey 
gold’ in order to encourage employers to retain and recruit elders, and by providing consultancy 
for companies wishing to form policies aimed at senior employees (Jensen & Madsen, 2015) . 
Equally important, the Danish pension system has been changed towards providing strong 
economic incentives to prolong working life.  
The political agreement over the Danish 2019 budget favours seniors, with new initiatives 
to secure their willingness to continue working, such as a cash reward for working more than 
30 hours a week (Lederne, 2019). Finally, government has placed great emphasis on preventing 
early exit to disability pension, through rehabilitation and subsidized part-time employment. 
Overall, these initiatives have resulted in significantly rising employment among the elderly 
(Andersen & Jensen, 2011; Jensen & Madsen, 2015; Lederne, 2019).  
A major issue in the Danish pension system is their ‘one size fits all’ approach to pensions, 
with a fixed pension age for all groups. Previously, a voluntary early retirement system had 
enabled people to retire up to 5 years before pension age. This was used by most unskilled 
workers, but by very few academics.  
The issue has caused great controversy, as many Danes believe that the pension age 
should be regulated according to your type of job. Leading up to the Danish election in 2019, 
the debate was reignited as political parties debated the probability of a differentiated pension 
age. However, while some believe that, those who entered the labour market early and have 
been worn down by years of manual labour should have the possibility of earlier retirement; 
other political parties deem the plan of a differentiated pension age impossible.  
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Provisions of old age security 
 
In the late 1960’s the Scandinavian countries began to move away from their former pension 
model, which was a universal, flat-rate, state-funded ‘people’s pension’ available to all citizens. 
However, rather than straying, Denmark continued along the former path and improved the 
people’s pension to a very generous level. However, the costs for the state were high, and the 
replacement rate was insufficient for middle class wage earners, this led to a crowding in of 
private or occupational pensions. To avoid a ‘dual pension system’ and to enhance private 
savings which were too low, fully funded labour market pensions were introduced as a second 
pillar of the pension system for nearly all workers from 1991 (see Table 3). These labour market 
pensions were not enacted by legislation, but via collective negotiations between the social 
partners; trade unions and the employers. Some employers and employees were not covered by 
collective negotiations, but the collective agreements set a standard which nearly all employers 
had to follow if they would be able to compete for labour power. Over the years, coverage has 
become nearly universal. 
Hence, Denmark was a laggard in introducing earnings-related pensions, but became a 
frontrunner in developing a multi-pillar system where the occupational pillar is a defined 
contribution system with the size of pensions depending on the contributions of the 
employee/employer.  
The Danish system may be described as a socially balanced variant of a World Bank 
(1994) system, even though it was introduced several years before the World Bank 
recommendations were issued (Andersen & Hatland, 2014; Andersen, 2015). The Danish 
people’s pension (see Table 3) is divided into a basic amount and a pensions supplement, means 
tested against income. Besides this, there are supplementary pensions and individual 
supplements for the poorest pensioners. Taken together, this elevates the poorest pensioners 
well above the relative poverty level and justifies the application of the term “universal” to 
characterize the system as a whole, even though the individual components have been de-
universalized. 
To a large degree, China’s pension reforms also reflect a multi-pillar approach, as 
recommended by the World Bank (CDRF, 2012). The overall structure of the Chinese and 
Danish pension systems are compared in Table 3.   
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Table 3. Overall structure of China and Denmark’s multi-pillar pension systems 
 China Denmark 
 Content Characteristics Content  Characteristics 
The first pillar Urban employee 
basic pension system 
 
Urban-rural resident 
basic pension system 
 
Pension system for 
civil servants and 
public employees 
Mandatory: 
social pool 
and individual 
account 
Peoples pension 
 
ATP: supplementary 
labour market pension 
 
Means-tested 
supplementary schemes 
(Ældrecheck - a 
supplement to 
pensioners with 
available funds less than 
86.000 dkr., housing 
benefits and individual 
supplements). 
Mandatory: tax 
financed 
 
Mandatory for wage 
earners: Fully funded 
(savings based) 
The second 
pillar 
Enterprise annuity 
schemes 
 
Occupational 
annuity schemes 
Voluntary and 
defined 
contribution 
Labour market pensions 
 
Civil servants’ pensions 
Semi-mandatory 
The third pillar Private  savings                  Voluntary Personal pensions (rent 
pension, old-age savings 
scheme, rate pension and 
private savings) 
     Voluntary 
Sources: based on Andersen, 2016: 188; Peng, 2016: 52  
 
The Chinese government first initiated pension reform among urban employees, and later 
expanded pension coverage to rural residents and urban non-working residents; these programs 
were called ‘the urban employee basic pension system’, ‘the new rural social pension system’ 
and ‘the urban resident social pension system’. However, in 2014, the latter two schemes were 
merged into ‘the urban-rural resident basic pension system’. Together with a pension scheme 
for civil servants and public employees, these schemes are regarded as the first pillar of the 
pension system.  
In addition, the Chinese government established supplementary programs; ‘the enterprise 
annuity and ‘occupational annuity schemes’ as the second pillar of the pension system. Finally, 
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private savings are regarded as the third pillar of the pension system (Peng, 2016) (see Table 
3).  
There is no unified public pension system in China; participation is based on working 
conditions and residence. However, the Chinese pension system has undergone several reforms 
in recent times (for an overview see Peng, 2016), in an attempt to achieve full coverage. The 
multi-pillar system is set up to share the burden of old age security between state, enterprises, 
and individuals, as is the case in Denmark. The reform has been successful in several ways: the 
urban employee basic pension system expanded rapidly from providing cover to 61.7 million 
people in 1990, to 304.3 million in 2012. The number of participants in the new rural pension 
system, which as of February 21st 2014 merged into the ‘urban-rural resident basic pension 
system’, grew by more than 200% from 2010 to 2011 alone, and by the end of 2012 there were 
483.7 million people covered by the scheme (Peng, 2016: 58-59). However, the pension system 
continues to be underdeveloped and possibly not well equipped for the challenge to come. The 
pension system faces a number of issues. These include inequality and equity, low replacement 
rates, fragmentation in social security old-age benefit, limited coverage, system deficit/financial 
unsustainability, and fragmentation across the rural/urban boundary (Cai & Cheng, 2014; Chen 
& Turner, 2015; Peng, 2016; van Dullemen et al., 2017) as illustrated in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
Table 4. Different pension arrangements among different sectors in China 
Sector Scheme Features Average coverage 
(CNY per month) 
Government and 
institutional units 
Pension system for civil 
servants and public employees 
Non-contributory and 
defined-benefit 
2543.44 
Urban enterprises Urban employee basic pension 
system 
Defined-contribution 
and funded 
1813.84 
Urban and rural residents Urban-rural resident basic 
pension system 
Defined-benefit and 
funded 
127.47 (The basic 70 CNY 
pension can be supplemented 
by local government revenue) 
Source: based on Zhu & Walker, 2018: 1410-1417  
 
The unequal institutional pension arrangements across different sectors and segments of 
the labour force (see Table 4), is testimony to the varying stability, coverage, and generosity of 
the different pension schemes in China.  
The disparities are particularly discernible across the rural/urban divide. An urban 
pension system was initiated in the early 1950s, whereas old age insurance for rural residents 
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was not initiated on a large scale until 2009 (Wu, 2013). Among other things, this has resulted 
in a high degree of stratification.  
The rural/urban divide is not only a geographical matter, but also a systemic one. Rural 
residents have been deprived of entitlements to which urban residents are privy. As a result, 
informal support has formed the basis of welfare provision in rural China. A study conducted 
by Liu (2017), found that the State relies directly or indirectly upon households’ support 
capacity as the State’s contribution to rural pension is minimal and inadequate and entitlement 
to a pension is dependent upon all family members participating in the scheme (Liu, 2017: 293-
294). The rural elderly are dependent upon their family for support, however given rapid 
migration by the working population, dependence patterns in rural areas have changed. Actual 
contact between adult children and ageing parents has been reduced, while remittances have 
become a major source of household income, and by extension pension supplement, in many 
rural areas. 
By comparison, many ageing countries have had comprehensive pension systems, 
including rural people, in place at a much earlier stage of population ageing. Denmark was the 
first country in the world to establish a comprehensive, residual pension system in 1891; the 
United Kingdom began to provide universal coverage of social security in 1946, and Japan and 
South Korea initiated their rural pension systems in 1971 and 1990, respectively (Cai, Giles, 
O'Keefe, & Wang, 2012).  
However, Zhu & Walker (2018) argue that those most marginalised by the stratified 
Chinese pension system are women with low human capital. Though it is not comparable, 
women are also worse off compared with their male counterparts within the Danish pension 
system. ‘Magisterbladet’ (Magisterbladet, 2019), a magazine for the Danish trade union ‘Dansk 
Magisterforening’, reported in spring 2019 that men save 37% more in pension savings, 
compared to women. However, this number is down from 51% in 2008, reportedly due to higher 
educational attainment among women, higher parity in salaries and more men being entitled to 
and making use of paternity leave. 
 
Raising retirement age  
The eligibility age for retirement varies greatly across the different pension schemes in China. 
In some professions, the retirement age is 60 years for both men and women, whilst in 
managerial positions, it is 55 years for women, and 50 years for women in other roles (Chen & 
Turner, 2015; Chen, 2016; Peng, 2016) as stated in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Basic pension system characteristics in Denmark and China  
 China Denmark 
Recipients of basic pension Sectoral and local residency, in some 
cases voluntary. 
 
Residence. 
Length of 
residence/participation 
required to obtain basic 
pension 
15 years 40 years 
Pensionable age 50-60 depending on residence, 
employment and gender. 
Semi-automatic adaption of retirement 
age to longevity.  
65 (increases to 68 by 2030 and 77 by 
2095). 
Coverage (2012), basic 
pension (the first pillar) 
Urban employee basic pension: 304 
million insured.  
The new rural pension system: 326 
million insured. 
Universal. 
  Sources: Chen, 2016; Nordiska ministerrådet & Nordiska ministerr, 2017; Peng, 2016)  
 
The retirement age in China is low. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) average normal pension age in 2016 was 64.3 years for men and 63.7 
years for women, across all schemes for an individual reaching retirement (OECD, 2017).  
The pension age in Denmark has traditionally been quite high (67 years until the 1980s). 
The same can be said for labour market participation for people in their sixties. Denmark has 
adopted a ‘semi-automatic adaption of retirement age to longevity’ approach; fixed pension 
ages have lost some meaning due to the defined contribution principle. The pension age, in age 
brackets, is indexed to life expectancy at age 60 as a result of the 2006 welfare reform. The 
pension age is regulated every fifth year, effective from the 1st of January 15 years later. The 
pension age was last regulated in 2015, and is set to increase to 68 years by 2030. Given the 
projected development in life expectancy, the indexation mechanism is projected to increase 
pension age to 77 years for those born in 2018 (Department of Labor and Recruitment, 2018).  
Increasing the pension age in China has been a prevalent topic in academia (see e.g. Liu 
& Miao, 2004; Peng et al., 2013; Chen & Groenewold, 2017; Feng et al., 2018), among 
politicians, and in the media (see e.g. China Economic Review, 2015; Xinhua, 2016; ECNS, 
2018). All suggest that it should be increased incrementally, until a non-gender specific pension 
age of 60–65 years is reached. However, this can only be considered a stepping-stone. 
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With the expected decline of the working age population in China (see Fig. 1), an increase 
in retirement age could be an effective way to increase the labour force participation rate (Chen 
& Turner, 2015; Peng, 2016; Peng & Mai, 2013). However, there are other cultural concerns in 
relation to China, namely the issue of grandparenting. Grandparenting in China is rooted in 
traditional family values and norms; childcare is considered an intergenerational collaboration 
between parents and grandparents. Despite an increasing demand for formal care solutions, 
family continues to be the primary source of care. The same is true in several other Asian 
countries; however, grandparenting appears to be more prevalent in China. As an example, a 
study conducted by Ko and Hank (2014: 649) suggests there are significant differences in the 
proportions of grandparents having provided any childcare between China (58%) and Korea 
(6%). This is a striking difference, although it corroborates previous research within the field. 
It is argued that the high participation of mothers in the labour force is likely to explain the 
significantly higher demand for grandparenting in China, together with the government’s 
failure to satisfy the demand for formal childcare facilities. Grandparents therefore provide a 
complementary source of care where the government fails. Because of this, it is likely that 
increasing the retirement age might place greater pressure on welfare provision in other areas.  
A related issue is that of ageism in the labour market. In China, ‘old age’ is traditionally 
recognised as occurring at 60 years, and this is considered the appropriate time to retire and 
make room for younger people in the labour market. According to a survey by Manulife (2014), 
approximately 64% of Chinese people who were interviewed had a negative attitude towards 
an increase in the official retirement age (Feng et al., 2018). As previously mentioned, the 
elderly have been pro-actively represented as grey gold in Denmark—helped by the 
dissemination of insights from gerontology—enabling employers to realise that the elderly can 
be as productive as younger workers (Jensen & Madsen, 2015). However, despite popular and 
political support, raising the pension age remains a difficult political subject, especially whilst 
the one size fits all approach to pensions in Danish politics seems an ongoing, unresolved issue.  
 
Assessments and conclusion 
China will face a steeply increasing old-age dependency ratio, a shrinking labour force, and a 
tense intergenerational relationship. Reforming China’s pension system is a demographically 
pressing issue, as well as socially vital.  
Recent literature has proposed numerous solutions to China’s demographic challenge, 
e.g. to strengthen and unify the pension systems, to create equality and social justice across 
sectors, to accommodate labour mobility and protect pension rights of migrant workers, to 
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create universal and adequate coverage and raising the pension age (see e.g. Cai & Cheng, 2014; 
Chen & Turner, 2015; Fang, 2016; Peng, 2016).  
However, China is not alone; many countries are ageing, but their approaches to 
stemming the demographic challenges differ widely and from these approaches, there are 
insights to be gained. Denmark is one of the most well-adjusted countries in terms of dealing 
with demographic change and though the Danish demographic challenge has never been as 
urgent as those faced by China, there are still lessons to be learned in the way that China 
addresses the challenge of population ageing.  
Below follows an outline of three factors from which China arguably could gain insights 
from Denmark in its attempt to meet the challenges of demographic change under current 
conditions. 
1. Avoiding the one size fits all problem 
China’s current retirement policy was initiated in the 1970s, at a time when the life 
expectancy was around 60–65 years. However, the longevity of Chinese citizens has since 
increased to more than 76 years (see Table 1). A gradual adaptation of the retirement age could 
increase the workforce and lower the expected increase in labour costs. Furthermore, it could 
reduce the pressure on the pension system. Extending the pension age could have significant 
consequences for social and economic prospects in China. Delaying the pension age could 
enhance the fiscal sustainability of the pension system and enhance their system-support ratios, 
with more contributors and fewer benefit receivers.  
Raising the retirement age is by far a new suggestion and awareness of this issue is high 
among Chinese policymakers. Meanwhile, China should take notice of the Danish problem of 
a one size fits all approach to pension age, which remains a major unresolved issue. A fixed 
pension age allows social inequality within health and life expectancy to manifest, as some will 
have a relatively short retirement – in poor health.  
In China, the pension age is differentiated depending on residence, employment and 
gender. Despite, as mentioned earlier, that both academia, politicians and the media suggest 
that the Chinese retirement age should be increased incrementally until a non-gender specific 
pension age of 60–65 years is reached, China should take note of the Danish issues when 
reforming the pensions system and maintain a differentiated pension age.  
2. Swaying public opinion 
Postponing the official retirement age and persuading the public to contribute to the 
mandatory public pension system is a thorny political initiative, which is facing much 
resistance, as willingness is low. Delaying retirement may also challenge the stereotype of the 
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elderly in China, where 60 years is the traditional marker of being old and there exists strong 
ageism against elderly people at work. Studies from Denmark have shown that employers in 
general hold a more positive view towards older employees (Larsen, 2006). Correspondingly, 
Danish employers feel a sense of urgency when it comes to population ageing and a shrinking 
workforce, with approximately 70% of Danish employers suggesting that population ageing 
poses an important challenge to society (Jensen, 2012).  
A sustainable pension reform thus needs to effectively address issues related to ageism in 
society and create awareness about the demographic challenges, rather than just postpone the 
pension age. As mentioned earlier, Denmark had great success with framing seniors, as grey 
gold to encourage employers to retain and recruit seniors, as well as to enable employers to 
realise that seniors can be as productive as younger workers. In order for China to fully make 
use of the capacity of seniors, they need to make the public realise their potential as an active 
part of the workforce.China has abolished the one-child policy and enacted a two-child policy 
to balance its demographic development. This could potentially lessen the demographic burden 
and ease the unintended consequences of the one-child policy, such as a reference for male 
children, high levels of abortions and female infanticide (Zeng & Hesketh, 2017). This is an 
important step, because as Esping-Andersen (2009: 9) puts it “pension reform begins with 
babies” and pro-natal policies (along with net-immigration) are the main reason why Denmark 
(along with the other Scandinavian countries) has faced lees demographic pressure compared 
to other European countries, as their TFR’s have remained comparatively high (Andersen & 
Hatland, 2014).   
However, in China there is little institutional support for women who choose to have two 
children. Childcare in China continues to be a mixed regime; families are considered as the 
main providers of childcare and the government merely plays a residual role.  
Due to the lack of policies to provide protection and support for families, young women 
are likely to experience problems when entering the labour market, as companies are reluctant 
to pay for repeated maternity leave and could therefore discriminate against young women. 
Since the abolition of the one-child policy, China’s ranking in the World Economic Forum’s 
global index of gender parity has fallen from 87th (2014) to 100th (2017) (World Economic 
Forum, 2014; 2017). Supporting women in their endeavours to raise a family and at the same 
time have a career is a necessary step to achieve balanced demographic development. 
The traditional role of grandparents has been to care for grandchildren, which lessens the 
need for social welfare. However, considering that, the proportion of grandchildren to 
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grandparents is declining quite drastic (according to Fig. 1); grandparents are at risk of being 
‘underutilized’, if the retirement age remains unchanged.  
It seems that Chinese social welfare is at a crossroads, the system had not yet adapted to 
the demographic changes, which could potentially leave a great deal of elderly people outside 
the labour market and with no other utility, as well as many families with only one child because 
the system does not support their endeavours to have two.  
The experiences of the development of the Danish pension system have been explored, 
with the aim of seeing to what extent they can add insights that are useful for the development 
of a sustainable approach to population ageing in China. 
It is evident from studying the Danish approach to demographic changes that pensions 
are not the sole focus; stimulating labour force participation, creating initiatives to postpose 
retirement and work longer and enforcing pro-natal polices are all part of the solution.    
This might be the greatest lesson to be learned from Denmark; it is unlikely that a sole 
focus on the elderly cohort will be enough to stem the demographic transition in China. There 
is a need to create a comprehensive policy approach, which addresses the demographic 
challenges as a many-facetted issue in society. A long-term, sustainable solution should be 
found in a holistic welfare state approach to ageing - as has been the case in Denmark. This is 
only possible if China addresses issues of care for the elderly, increasing the pension age, while 
at the same time addressing issues related to declining fertility and gender parity.  
The changes proposed here are by no means straightforward. The Danish demographic 
transition has been slow and started about 100 years before the Chinese transition. Though 
China still has the opportunity to build social welfare and there continues to be room for socio-
political reform, it will not be an easy task.  As shown in Fig. 1, the demographic composition 
of China is changing rapidly, and the changes needed to accommodate this development will 
be expensive and will likely lead to some opposition.  
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, changes within one policy field, may lead to greater 
pressure on welfare provision in other areas, for example raising the retirement age may place 
greater pressure on public childcare. China is nearing a crossroads in determining the 
relationship between family, state and market in terms of welfare provisions.  
Transferring the provision of social security and care from the family to the 
state/community will reach beyond social policymaking. In Denmark, this development 
happened gradually, however, given rapid demographic change the Chinese population will 
have to adapt to these new citizenship rights much faster. Due to this, any pension reform must 
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take into consideration the capacity for adaption on a personal and societal level to secure a 
sustainable approach to population ageing.  
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